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Abstract 
The District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant (DCTAG) program is a federally funded financial aid program that 
allows District residents to pay in-state tuition rates at public colleges and universities throughout the United States. 
One potential side effect of this program is that colleges and universities that enroll meaningful numbers of D.C. 
residents may have incentives to increase out-of-state tuition rates. We test this hypothesis empirically. Our preferred 
specification suggests that there is little evidence that colleges and universities that enroll a high percentage of out-of-
state students from D.C. increased out-of-state tuition in response to the DCTAG program.
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  Concerned about the lack of affordable higher education options for residents of the 
District of Columbia, the United States Congress passed the District of Columbia College Access 
Act in November 1999.  The Act created the District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant 
(DCTAG) program, which beginning in Fall 2000 allowed D.C. residents to pay in-state tuition 
at public colleges and universities throughout the U.S.
1  The federal government pays the 
difference between out-of-state and in-state tuition up to $10,000 annually and a student lifetime 
limit of $50,000.
2  The program also provides a $2500 tuition subsidy to District residents 
attending private colleges and universities in D.C. and to District residents attending private 
historically black institutions throughout the country.  Abraham and Clark (2006) and Kane 
(2007) show that the DCTAG program has been highly successful at increasing the number of 
District residents enrolling in college and the effect has been largest at historically black four-
year public institutions. 
  One potential concern with the DCTAG program is that it may provide incentives for 
some institutions to increase out-of-state tuition rates.  The so-called Bennett (1987) hypothesis, 
named for former Secretary of Education William Bennett, suggests that colleges and 
universities might increase tuition to capture increases in financial aid.  McPherson and Schapiro 
(1991) and Singell and Stone (2007) find that increased federal aid through the Pell Grant 
program has resulted in higher tuition rates, especially for out-of-state students and at private 
colleges.  Similarly, Long (2004) finds that higher education institutions in Georgia increased 
tuition rates in response to the state’s HOPE Scholarship program.  Other studies that examine 
the various determinants of nonresident tuition include Greene (1994), Rizzo and Ehrenberg 
(2004), Dotterweich and Baryla (2005), Adkisson and Peach (2008), Calhoun and Kamerschen 
(2010), and Winters (2011). 
DCTAG should have little or no effect on tuition at institutions that enroll very few D.C. 
residents, but it could plausibly affect tuition at institutions where D.C. residents are relatively 
important.  By the law of demand, an increase in the price of enrollment will generally cause a 
decrease in the quantity demanded.  The DCTAG program lowers the price at eligible 
institutions for District residents and makes them unresponsive to price changes at public 
institutions, as long as the difference between in-state and out-of-state tuition is less than 
$10,000.  Therefore, the benefits of raising out-of-state tuition are greater for institutions with a 
high percentage of D.C. residents than for those with few D.C. residents.     
  This paper provides an empirical test of the Bennett Hypothesis for the DCTAG program.  
Specifically, we investigate whether DCTAG caused out-of-state tuition to disproportionately 
increase at four-year public institutions where a relatively high percentage of nonresidents are 
from D.C.  While there is some evidence of a positive correlation, the effect disappears once 
institution-specific linear time trends are included.  Our preferred specifications suggest that 
there is little evidence that colleges and universities increased tuition in response to DCTAG. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section discusses the data and empirical 
methodology we use to test the Bennett Hypothesis for the DCTAG program.  The third section 
presents the empirical results and a final section concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 The program initially was restricted to public institutions in Maryland and Virginia, but was expanded to public 
institutions in all states in May 2000.  
2 This paper uses the terms “nonresident” and “out-of-state” interchangeably throughout. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
 
  This paper tests the Bennett Hypothesis for the DCTAG program using tuition data from 
the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) between years 1990-2008.  The 
full sample includes all 570 public four-year institutions charging positive tuition except for the 
University of the District of Columbia.  We begin by estimating variants of the following 
equation: 
 
         =    +    +     +      +      1999  ∗         ,    +          ,    +    ,   (1) 
 
where          is log out-of-state tuition for institution   in year  ,    is an institution fixed 
effect,    is a year dummy,    is an institution-specific coefficient on a linear time trend,     is a 
set of explanatory variables with parameter vector  ,     1999  is an indicator equal to one for 
years 2000-2008 and zero for years 1990-1998
3,         ,    is the share of nonresident 
freshmen at institution   from D.C. in the previous year and comes from IPEDS, and     is an 
error term.  We measure         with a one year lag to reduce concerns about reverse 
causality and because institutions typically set tuition rates for the upcoming academic year 
before students officially enroll and start taking classes.   
Our main parameter of interest is  , which measures the effect on out-of-state tuition 
from the interaction between the share of nonresidents from D.C. (lagged one year) and the 
treatment period.  Basically,   measures whether public institutions with a high percentage of 
D.C. residents experienced greater out-of-state tuition increases after DCTAG was implemented 
than institutions with very few D.C. residents.  The Bennett Hypothesis claims that institutions 
respond to federal financial aid programs by increasing tuition rates and suggests that   will be 
positive.  
The other explanatory variables in     thought to affect out-of-state tuition include log in-
state tuition, log enrollment lagged one year, log population of 18-19 year olds in the state, the 
state unemployment rate, log median household income, log state appropriations for higher 
education, the return to a bachelor’s degree, and an indicator for a state merit aid program.  In-
state tuition and enrollment data also come from IPEDS, population and household income come 
from the Bureau of the Census, unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
state appropriations come from the Grapevine annual reports, the return to a bachelor’s degree is 
computed from the March Current Population Survey, and the merit program indicator variable 
is based on programs reported in Heller (2004) and Orsuwan and Heck (2009).  All dollar 
amounts are converted to year 2008 dollars using the BLS Consumer Price Index.   
One limitation with estimating equation (1) is that data on student residences are only 
available for the years 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998 prior to 2000, and the missing data cause 
some pre-DCTAG years to be excluded from the analysis.  Additionally, there could be concerns 
that the share of nonresidents from D.C. is endogenous even using a one year lag.  To address 
these limitations we employ a second approach of estimating variants of: 
 
         =    +    +     +      +      1999  ∗         ,     +    ,      (2) 
 
                                                 
3 The year 1999 is excluded to alleviate concerns that some institutions may have anticipated DCTAG’s adoption 
and altered their tuition policies before the program was enacted. 
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where         ,     is the average share of nonresident freshmen at institution   from D.C. 
prior to creation of DCTAG, computed as the average share during the years 1992, 1994, 1996 
and 1998.          ,     is fixed over time and allows us to include all years between 1990 
and 2008 (except again 1999).  The separate effects for     1999  and         ,     are 
respectively captured by time dummies and institution fixed effects.  Our main parameter of 
interest is again  , which now measures the effect on out-of-state tuition from the interaction 
between the average percentage of nonresidents from D.C. prior to DCTAG and the treatment 
period.  Therefore,   measures whether public institutions that enrolled a high percentage of 
D.C. residents prior to the program experienced greater out-of-state tuition increases after the 
program was implemented than institutions that enrolled very few D.C. residents.  The Bennett 
Hypothesis again suggests that   will be positive. 
In addition to estimating equations (1) and (2) for the full sample, we also estimate the 
equations separately for the 49 public institutions that enroll a non-trivial percentage of 
nonresidents from D.C., defined as being greater than one percent of nonresidents during the 
years 1992-1998; i.e., the smaller sample includes the 49 public institutions with 
        ,     > 0.01. 
Table I reports the average share of nonresidents from D.C. for both the 1992-1998 and 
2000-2007 time periods and the percentage change in nonresident tuition between 1998 and 2008 
for public institutions with a D.C. share of nonresidents for 2000-2007 greater than 0.02.  Bowie 
State, a historically black university in Maryland tops the list with 42 and 36 percent of 
nonresidents coming from D.C. during the 1992-1998 and 2000-2007 periods, respectively.  A 
number of other institutions have meaningful shares of nonresidents from D.C. including several 
other historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs).  Table I also shows that the share of 
nonresidents from D.C. increased for many institutions after DCTAG was implemented, 
consistent with suggestions by Abraham and Clark (2006) and Kane (2007) that the DCTAG 
program increased college enrollment among District residents.  Table I also shows a wide range 
of values for the percentage change in real nonresident tuition rates during the period 1998-2008, 
but nearly all of the institutions had sizable increases.
4  
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
  Table II provides regression results for several variants of equation (1).  For results 
shown, all equations are estimated modeling the disturbance term as an AR(1) process to account 
for serial correlation in the error term and report the Bhargava et al. (1982) Durbin-Watson 
Statistic.   In results not shown, we also explore the effects of instead clustering standard errors 
by institution and by state and find qualitatively similar results and significance levels.  Results 
in the first three columns are for the full sample and results in the last three columns include only 
the 49 institutions with         ,     > 0.01.  The first and fourth columns include only 
institution fixed effects, year dummies, the share of nonresidents from D.C., and the primary 
variable of interest, the interaction between post-1999 and the share of nonresidents from D.C.  
The second and fifth columns add the additional regressors but not the institution-specific time 
                                                 
4 The lone exception is SUNY College at Buffalo (which is not the same as SUNY University at Buffalo), which in 
2007 adopted a policy of charging equal tuition rates for residents and nonresidents, resulting in a considerable 
decrease in nonresident tuition rates. 
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trends.  The third and sixth columns are for the full specifications that include the institution-




Table I: Share of Recent FTF Nonresidents from D.C. for Select Public Institutions 
  Institution  State  HBCU  D.C. Share  D.C. Share  %∆ in NRT 
         2000-2007  1992-1998  1998-2008 
Bowie State University  MD  Yes  0.362  0.420  95.7 
University of Maryland-University College  MD  No  0.200  0.176  125.2 
Fayetteville State University  NC  Yes  0.176  0.081  50.8 
Cheyney University of Pennsylvania  PA  Yes  0.167  0.091  62.3 
University of Maryland Eastern Shore  MD  Yes  0.157  0.134  55.9 
Virginia State University  VA  Yes  0.153  0.062  69.2 
Coppin State University  MD  Yes  0.134  0.120  70.2 
Pennsylvania State University-Greater Allegheny  PA  No  0.133  0.012  94.9 
North Carolina Central University  NC  Yes  0.131  0.070  48.7 
Virginia Commonwealth University  VA  No  0.121  0.027  55.7 
North Carolina A & T State University  NC  Yes  0.114  0.051  45.5 
Norfolk State University  VA  Yes  0.114  0.060  122.9 
St Mary's College of Maryland  MD  No  0.108  0.014  110.8 
Winston-Salem State University  NC  Yes  0.107  0.049  50.8 
Delaware State University  DE  Yes  0.083  0.074  69.6 
Frostburg State University  MD  No  0.079  0.043  109.2 
Pennsylvania State University-Mont Alto  PA  No  0.072  0.016  94.9 
Texas Southern University  TX  Yes  0.066  0.007  90.9 
Elizabeth City State University  NC  Yes  0.066  0.043  49.4 
George Mason University  VA  No  0.055  0.033  79.8 
Glenville State College  WV  No  0.054  0.106  124.3 
Morgan State University  MD  Yes  0.053  0.055  69.4 
University of Michigan-Flint  MI  No  0.050  0.000  34.8 
Lincoln University of Pennsylvania  PA  Yes  0.046  0.072  74.6 
West Virginia State University  WV  Yes  0.036  0.047  89.6 
Rutgers University-Camden  NJ  No  0.034  0.020  106.7 
Old Dominion University  VA  No  0.034  0.007  67.5 
University of Pittsburgh-Bradford  PA  No  0.034  N/A  59.2 
SUNY College at Buffalo  NY  No  0.029  0.000  -38.2 
Temple University  PA  No  0.027  0.023  79.4 
Pennsylvania State University-Harrisburg  PA  No  0.027  N/A  53.0 
Pennsylvania State University-Beaver  PA  No  0.026  0.010  94.7 
University of Pittsburgh-Greensburg  PA  No  0.025  N/A  59.5 
Pennsylvania State University-Altoona  PA  No  0.024  0.008  99.5 
Central State University  OH  Yes  0.024  0.016  56.8 
Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University  FL  Yes  0.023  0.027  76.6 
University of Maryland-Baltimore County  MD  No  0.022  0.030  89.2 
The University of Virginia's College at Wise  VA  No  0.022  0.000  109.3 
Millersville University of Pennsylvania  PA  No  0.020  0.004  53.3 
Boise State University  ID  No  0.020  0.000  58.1 
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Table II: Results Using 1 Year Lagged Percentage of Nonresidents from DC 
         1  2  3  4  5  6 
After 1999*Share of Nonresidents from DC, 
1 Year Lag  0.170  0.188*  0.094  0.147  0.046  0.095 
 
(0.122)  (0.107)  (0.121)  (0.140)  (0.142)  (0.151) 
Share of Nonresidents from DC, 1 Year Lag  -0.002  -0.028  -0.021  -0.001  0.000   0.024  
 
(0.068)  (0.061)  (0.068)  (0.084)  (0.088)  (0.095) 
Log In-State Tuition 
 
0.668***  0.698*** 
 
0.370***  0.393*** 
   
(0.015)  (0.014) 
 
(0.062)  (0.078) 
Log Enrollment, 1 Year Lag 
 
0.059***  0.058*** 
 
0.007  -0.012 
   
(0.014)  (0.012) 
 
(0.035)  (0.042) 
Log Population Age 18-19 
 
0.030  0.169*** 
 
0.065  0.307** 
   
(0.026)  (0.030) 
 
(0.101)  (0.139) 
Unemployment Rate 
 
-0.005*  0.002 
 
-0.019*  -0.001 
   
(0.003)  (0.003) 
 
(0.011)  (0.013) 
Log Median Household Income 
 
-0.030  0.100*** 
 
0.349***  0.041 
   
(0.026)  (0.020) 
 
(0.073)  (0.101) 
Log State Appropriations 
 
-0.029  -0.034 
 
0.123  -0.069 
   
(0.021)  (0.024) 
 
(0.087)  (0.101) 
Return to Bachelor's Degree 
 
-0.007  -0.005 
 
0.004  -0.002 
   
(0.006)  (0.006) 
 
(0.023)  (0.023) 
Merit 
 
0.017**  0.004 
 
0.017  0.006 
   
(0.008)  (0.009) 
 
(0.030)  (0.030) 
              Number of Institutions  570  570  570  49  49  49 
Number of Observations  7707  7707  7707  660  660  660 
Institution Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Institution-Specific Time Trends  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Time Trends F-test P-value 
   
<0.001 
   
<0.001 
Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson Statistic  0.578  0.678  1.205  0.880  1.069  1.710 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses modeled as AR(1) process. 
      *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 
         
 
 
  The main variable of interest, the interaction between the post-1999 indicator and the 
share of nonresidents from D.C., has a coefficient ( ) of 0.170 in column 1 that is not quite 
statistically significant at the ten percent level of significance (p-value=0.162).  Including the 
additional regressors in column 2, however, increases the   coefficient slightly to 0.182 and it is 
now statistically significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that DCTAG may have caused 
some institutions to increase nonresident tuition.  However, when we include the institution-
specific time trends in column 3, the coefficient on the interaction term falls to 0.092 and is not 
statistically significant.  The coefficient is also fairly small in magnitude.  The interaction 
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coefficient suggests that a 0.10 difference in the share of nonresidents from D.C. (a relatively 
sizable difference as seen in Table I) would increase nonresident tuition by less than one percent 
following the implementation of the program.  We also conduct a specification test of whether 
the institution-specific time trends are jointly significant and can reject the null that they are 
jointly insignificant at the 0.001 level of significance.  Our preferred specification is, therefore, 
the full model in column 3 that includes the institution-specific time trends.  According to this 
specification, there is minimal evidence that DCTAG caused institutions enrolling a high 
percentage of nonresidents from D.C. to increase nonresident tuition in response to the program. 
  Some of the other variables, however, do significantly affect out-of-state tuition rates.  As 
one might expect, out-of-state tuition is positively affected by increases in in-state tuition in both 
columns 2 and 3.  Similarly, higher enrollment in the previous year causes institutions to raise 
nonresident tuition.  Column 3 also suggests that the number of 18-19 year old individuals in the 
state causes nonresident tuition to increase.  Median household income in the state also has a 
positive effect on nonresident tuition in column 3.  The rest of the variables are statistically 
insignificant for the full specification in column 3. 
  Restricting the sample to the 49 public institutions with         ,     > 0.01 in 
columns 4-6 of Table II tells a similar story.  The interaction term coefficient ( ) is again fairly 
small in all three specifications and it is now statistically insignificant in all three specifications.  
The reduced number of institutions also changes the results for several variables in Table II, so 
that only in-state tuition and the 18-19 year old population are significant in the full specification 
in the sixth column.  The institution-specific time trends, however, continue to be jointly 
significant.   
  Table III presents results for several variants of equation (2).  The   coefficient for the 
interaction between the post-1999 indicator and the share of nonresidents from D.C. follows a 
similar pattern to that in Table II.  The coefficient is 0.374 and marginally insignificant             
(p-value=0.102) in column 1.  Adding the additional regressors in column 2 increases the 
coefficient to 0.421 and it is now significant at the five percent level.  However, when we include 
the institution-specific time trends in column 3, the coefficient decreases to 0.153 and is not 
statistically significant at the ten percent level.  An F-test again confirms that the institution-
specific time trends are jointly significant, so the full specification in the third column is again 
our preferred specification.  For the other variables in column 3, in-state tuition and the 
population of 18-19 year olds again have statistically significant positive effects on nonresident 
tuition and state appropriations has a significantly negative effect.   
Restricting the sample to the 49 public institutions with         ,     > 0.01 yields 
similar results in columns 4-6.  The   coefficient for the interaction term in column 6 is actually 
negative at -0.146 but is not statistically significant.  An F-test again supports the full 
specification that includes the institution-specific time trends.  The results in Table III, therefore, 
suggest that DCTAG did not cause out-of-state tuition to increase at public institutions with a 
high percentage of nonresidents from D.C.  In results not shown, we also use a similar approach 
to separately examine the effect of the DCTAG program on tuition at eligible private institutions 
with a high percentage of students from D.C.  The effect of DCTAG on tuition at private 
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Table III: Results Using Average Percentage of Nonresidents from DC, 1992-1998 
       1  2  3  4  5  6 
After 1999*Average Share of 
Nonresidents from DC, 1992-1998  0.374  0.423**  0.153  0.278  0.367*  -0.146 
 
(0.228)  (0.191)  (0.246)  (0.225)  (0.207)  (0.259) 
Log In-State Tuition 
 
0.711***  0.725*** 
 
0.496***  0.607*** 
   
(0.012)  (0.013) 
 
(0.059)  (0.058) 
Log Enrollment, 1 Year Lag 
 
0.017  0.026** 
 
-0.069  -0.025 
   
(0.012)  (0.011) 
 
(0.043)  (0.039) 
Log Population Age 18-19 
 
0.019  0.220*** 
 
0.068  0.166 
   
(0.030)  (0.028) 
 
(0.113)  (0.115) 
Unemployment Rate 
 
-0.003  -0.001 
 
-0.012  -0.013 
   
(0.002)  (0.002) 
 
(0.009)  (0.010) 
Log Median Household Income 
 
-0.031  0.007 
 
0.047  0.039 
   
(0.023)  (0.024) 
 
(0.090)  (0.088) 
Log State Appropriations 
 
-0.011  -0.063*** 
 
-0.012  -0.031 
   
(0.018)  (0.019) 
 
(0.075)  (0.081) 
Return to Bachelor's Degree 
 
-0.008  -0.006 
 
0.008  -0.002 
   
(0.005)  (0.006) 
 
(0.019)  (0.020) 
Merit 
 
0.013*  0.009 
 
0.019  0.000 
   
(0.008)  (0.008) 
 
(0.027)  (0.026) 
              Number of Institutions  570  570  570  49  49  49 
Number of Observations  9543  9543  9543  831  831  831 
Institution Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Institution-Specific Time Trends  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Time Trends F-test P-value 
   
<0.001 
   
<0.001 
Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson Statistic  0.558  0.593  1.078  0.751  0.866  1.502 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses modeled as AR(1) process. 
      *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 





Financial aid programs are intended to lower the cost of higher education and increase 
access to college for students who might otherwise be unable to afford it.  An important concern 
with publicly funded financial aid programs is that they may encourage colleges and universities 
to increase tuition rates for students.  This paper considers whether the DCTAG program led to 
increased out-of-state tuition rates at public institutions with a high percentage of nonresidents 
from D.C.  While there is some evidence of a positive correlation, this effect is small and 
statistically insignificant once institution-specific time trends are included.  Our preferred 
specifications, therefore, suggest that there is little evidence that the DCTAG program caused 
colleges and universities to increase out-of-state tuition rates. 
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